Since its first international mission to then-East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has participated in more than 30 overseas missions, ranging from civil assistance (CA), peace support operations (PSOs), counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) to stabilisation, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) missions. Singapore’s contribution to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions started with the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 1989, when the SAF sent a small contingent of SAF Officers, policemen and civil servants to support Namibia’s election. While still relatively new to international PSOs, SAF commanders and command teams have assumed command leadership roles as Force Commander of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and led the counter-piracy Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) on three occasions. Despite the SAF’s increased experience and expertise in overseas missions, such missions do not fall neatly under the ambit of the armed forces — particularly in one that is primarily geared towards homeland defence with citizen soldiers at its core. These “non-war” operations — under the broad category of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) — are conducted beyond the traditional security paradigm where the application of kinetic military force may be the exception rather than the norm. In the case of the SAF, the focus appears to be on the following: HADR, PSO, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and CA. These missions are often conducted away from home and increasingly, out of Singapore’s immediate region of Southeast Asia. From closer to home in Southeast Asia to more than 6,000kilometres away from home in Afghanistan and more than 7,000kilometres away in the GOA, the SAF and its servicemen and servicewomen have been deployed in overseas missions away from the comforts of home.

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Both Israel and Singapore engage in military-technological innovation in areas deemed critical to strategic sovereignty. Both countries have consistently championed high levels of funding for military R&D and for maintaining and nurturing indigenous defense industries. Both countries have, to a varying degree, also strongly supported the cultivation of local S&T, including the spin-on of commercial high-technology breakthroughs into the defense sector. Israel has been more successful when it comes to military-technological innovation, mostly because it has to: its strategic situation is much more tenuous than Singapore’s. Singapore, on the other hand, faces much less of an existential threat, and so its military-technological innovation activities are more one of desire than necessity.

Against a backdrop of an expanded threat horizon and a state’s limited ability to mitigate all of them, the chapter assesses the measures implemented by the Singaporean government in order to secure the nation-state and the good life for its people. The chapter argues the Singaporean government has been remarkably successful at protecting two key national security concerns of the city-state as identi ed since independence: (1) the protection of Singaporean sovereignty and (2) the maintenance of public order. However, due to the expanding threat horizon and the complexity of ever-evolving threats, for continued success, the process of securitisation in Singapore — that is, who is permitted to frame a threat and who decides what the best response is — may have to alter over time.

National security covers a wide spectrum ranging from internal security to external defence. Because it usually absorbs a significant part of the government budget, organising for national security is an important aspect of good governance. On separation, newly independent Singapore inherited from Malaysia national security legislation that focused on internal security, reflecting the concerns of the day. Laws like the Preservation of Public Security Ordnance (PPSO) of 1955, the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960 and the Public Order (Preservation) Act (POPA) of 1963 had been enacted to deal with the turbulent post-war period of communist-instigated labour unrest, student demonstrations and riots culminating in the Malayan Emergency. But even before independence, with the end of the communist insurgency, the centre of gravity of national security had already begun to shift to external defence. In 1963, Indonesia launched an armed Confrontation — Konfrontasi — against the “neo-colonialist” creation of Malaysia, including Singapore. Following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the Vietnam War started to escalate. Even after separation, Malaysian Armed Forces still maintained a presence in Singapore. Its commander, BG Alsagoff, insisted on providing a military escort for Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew when he went to the opening of the first parliament in December 1965. This was a less than subtle message to Mr Lee and his cabinet that the defence of Singapore was not in the hands of Singaporeans. In these circumstances, it was natural that external defence should exercise the minds of the Singapore leadership. Furthermore, although the British maintained a large military presence in Singapore and Malaysia, political pressure was growing back in London to cut its military presence East of the Suez.

Singapore has enjoyed peace and security the past 50 years of its independence. From being virtually defenceless when we separated from Malaysia on 9 August 1965, Singapore has been able to build its armed forces comprising a full-fledged Army, seagoing Navy and modern air force, comprising 45,000 to 50,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers, sailors and airmen, with over 250,000 reservists who can be mobilised in short order. Looking back at the growth and development of our small island nation from a third world entrepot port to a first world global trading hub and financial centre, I believe we succeeded in doing so because we had been able to build up our defence capability in tandem with our economic development, while pursuing a foreign policy that sought a maximum number of friends and maintaining the freedom to be ourselves as an independent nation